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Abstract
Compulsory military service typically drafts young men when they are at the height 
of their learning ability. Thus, it can be expected to depress the demand for higher 
education since skill atrophy and the delayed entry into the civilian labor market reduce 
the returns to human-capital investments. Attending university, however, might open 
the possibility to avoid the draft, leading to an increase in the demand for tertiary 
education. To estimate the causal eﬀ  ect of conscription on the probability to obtain 
a university degree, we use a regression-discontinuity design that employs special 
regulations associated with the introduction of conscription in Germany in 1956. We 
estimate conscription to increase the probability of having a university degree.
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Conscription into the armed forces is still actively enforced in many countries. Typically, men
arecalledaroundthetimetheyare18yearsoldforamedicalexamination, afterwhichtheywill
either be declared ﬁt to serve in the armed forces or exempted (temporarily or permanently)
from service. Upon being drafted, the selected individuals are to serve in the armed forces
for a speciﬁed period of time, usually for about two years. Military service can therefore be
construed as a disruption of the human-capital-acquisition process of young men.
In several respects, this interruption is an important factor in an individual’s demand for
higher (i.e., tertiary) education. As Keller, Poutvaara and Wagener [2009] and Di Pietro [2009]
point out, military service negatively affects the stock of human capital because academic skills
acquired before military service may depreciate when these skills lie fallow during active duty.
Furthermore, skills learned in the armed forces may not be necessarily transferable to the civil-
ian labor market.
Moreover, due to their time in service, conscripts graduate from any higher educational
facility at a later age than those graduates who have not been drafted. Hence, if there is a
mandatory retirement age, as in Germany, conscripts have less time for reaping the returns to
human-capital investments. This effect directly translates to a decline in the quantity of edu-
cation demanded. Keller, Poutvaara and Wagener [2009] show that the number of university
graduates indeed tend to be lower in countries that rely on compulsory military service (CMS)
when compared to countries with an all-volunteer force, while adjusting for other factors that
could plausibly inﬂuence the decision to seek university training.
In most countries, however, university students are granted a temporary exemption from
military service. This temporary exemption is typically converted to a permanent one as soon
as the student reaches a certain cutoff age. Even if a student graduates before reaching the
cutoff age, being called into service after obtaining a university degree is not a prevalent phe-
nomenon. These regulations might encourage young men to pursue a strategy of deliberate
draft avoidance. This positive effect of conscription on educational demand has been docu-
mented for countries such as the United States [Card and Lemieux 2001] and France [Maurin
and Xenogiani 2007].
This paper examines the issue within the context of Germany, where national service is still
4compulsory until June 30, 2011 for men either in the form of military service (Grundwehrdienst)
or civilian service (Zivildienst) for conscientious objectors.1 Our objective is to estimate the
causal impact of CMS on the probability of graduating from university. Since very special
rules were governing the German draft in the 1950s, we can use a regression-discontinuity
(RD) design to identify this causal effect: When Germany was allowed to rearm itself after
becoming a member of NATO in 1955, men born on or after July 1, 1937 had to undergo mental
and physical examinations upon coming of age to determine whether they were ﬁt to serve in
the German armed forces (Bundeswehr).
Those born earlier were exempted from CMS, though. Colloquially, they are called the
“White Cohort” (weißer Jahrgang) because they neither served in World War II nor in the new
German armed forces. We deliberately use the White Cohort as a control group to which we
can compare the educational outcomes of those facing a positive probability of being drafted.
Assuming men born on either side of the threshold date are different only in that the White
Cohort did not serve in the armed forces but are identical otherwise, the difference in the
educational outcomes of the White Cohort and the subsequent cohort can be construed as the
causal effect of conscription.
Our analysis indicates that, for the cohorts under study, the actual causal impact of con-
scription on the probability of having a university degree is positive and substantial in mag-
nitude. Exploiting the discontinuous treatment-assignment mechanism, the RD coefﬁcient es-
timates based on two-sample two-stage least squares (TS2SLS) range from 12 to 15 percentage
points, with the highest estimate being observed for precisely those men for whom we believe
the RD estimates to be most appropriate. Therefore, we conclude that conscription increased
men’s university graduation rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the
relevant literature, Section 3 introduces the data, and Section 4 presents our estimation strategy
and discusses the ensuing results. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the policy
implications of our ﬁndings.
1Conscription is enshrined in Art. 12a of Germany’s constitution (Grundgesetz f¨ ur die Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land). The rules and regulations are contained in the Wehrpﬂichtgesetz. Civilian service is governed by the Zivildien-
stgesetz. In the much earlier time period examined in this paper, the number of conscientious objectors had been
negligible. [Haberhauer and Maneval 2000]
52 Related literature
The present study locates itself at the intersection of two established areas of the economic lit-
erature. The ﬁrst examines the effects of military service on veterans, the second, the effects of
career interruptions on subsequent labor-market outcomes. With regard to the former, Angrist
[1990] ﬁnds that white Vietnam War veterans subsequently realized lower annual wages than
nonveterans. However, updated estimates by Angrist and Chen [2008] using the same data
show that the wage gap vanishes in the long run. In any case, these results suggest military
service is costly for those who have to serve.
Angrist and Krueger [1994] demonstrate that the higher wages of World War II veterans
compared to nonveterans are merely the result of how soldiers were selected into the armed
forces, i.e., thatsimplecross-sectionalcomparisonsarebiased. Takingthenonrandomselection
into the armed forces into account, serving in the war was not found to have a positive causal
impact on wages. While these studies use the date of birth as an instrument for veteran status,
Imbens and van der Klaauw [1995] speciﬁcally look at the effect of conscription (as opposed
to being a veteran of any war) in the Netherlands. Using variations in the probability to be
drafted across birth cohorts as an instrument for being conscripted, they show that draftees
earn about 5 percent less than those who did not serve.
Methodologically, the present paper is closest to Buonanno [2006], Bauer et al. [2009], and
Grenet, Hart and Roberts [2011]. These papers take advantage of the discontinuity in the prob-
ability of being drafted into military service across birth cohorts. In the United Kingdom,
this was caused by the initiation of conscription in 1949 and its subsequent abolition in 1960.
Buonanno [2006] uses the latter to estimate the impact of conscription on earnings and on ed-
ucational attainment. He ﬁnds that conscription penalizes men but that the resulting earnings
disadvantage should be attributed to lost labor-market experience and not to the educational
channel. In fact, he ﬁnds little evidence to suggest that the demand for higher education is
negatively affected by conscription.
Grenet, Hart and Roberts [2011] use the start of conscription in the UK to identify the effects
of conscription on long-term real earnings. Their ﬁndings indicate that conscription had no
signiﬁcant effect on such earnings. With the distinct advantage of having precise birth date
information at their disposal, Bauer et al. [2009] use the same White Cohort/non-White Cohort
6distinction described in the present paper to obtain an estimate of the causal impact of CMS
on long-run labor-market outcomes in Germany. The authors conclude that the superior labor-
market performance of those who served in the Bundeswehr is merely an artifact of selection
bias introduced at the time of the draft (e.g., healthier men, who are more likely to perform
well in the labor market, are precisely the ones who were called to serve).
Other authors examine explicitly the effect of military service on educational outcomes.
Here, the evidence is rather mixed. Using the trend in college enrollment of women as a
comparison, Card and Lemieux [2001] estimate that CMS raised college attendance rates by
4–6 percentage points and the fraction of men born in the mid-1940’s with a college degree by
about 2 percentage points. The authors argue that these results can be explained by a draft-
avoidance strategy. A similar study concerning the effect of the abolition of conscription in
France was conducted by Maurin and Xenogiani [2007]. In their paper, draft-avoidance be-
havior was also thought to motivate young men to stay within the formal educational system.
Similar to the results obtained from US data, France saw a signiﬁcant decrease in the time
spent in school by young and in the share of degree-holders among adult men as a result of
the abolition. Bound and Turner [2002] present results indicating that state funding for college
through the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (the so-called “G.I. Bill”) increased the
post-secondary educational attainment of G.I.’s.
Cipollone and Rosolia [2007] exploit a natural experiment in southern Italy caused by an
earthquake in 1980. This natural disaster prompted politicians to exempt certain birth cohorts
of men from military service. The authors ﬁnd that the exemption raised boys’ high school
graduation rates by over 2 percentage points. Di Pietro [2009], also using data from Italy,
ﬁnds that the abolition of conscription raised university participation for individuals from
more privileged family backgrounds but depressed university participation for individuals
who are more disadvantaged. Finally, Keller, Poutvaara and Wagener [2009] analyze the issue
at the macroeconomic level by taking 22 OECD countries and looking at the impact of CMS on
the acquisition of post-secondary education. They ﬁnd that enforcement intensity—measured
as the share of the labor force conscripted and the duration of service—have a signiﬁcantly
negative impact on university enrollment ﬁgures.
In addition to these studies that are directly related to military evidence, several studies
7analyze the impact of career disruptions (e.g., unemployment) on future labor-market out-
comes. The conventional wisdom is that career interruptions imply foregone experience in
the labor market and skill atrophy (i.e., human-capital depreciation). These disruptions appar-
ently have a persistent effect [Kletzer and Fairlie 2003] and even their timing and type seem
to matter [Kunze 2002]. This line of research concentrates predominantly on the interruptions
experienced by women due to child-bearing and -rearing [Albrecht et al. 1999]. These breaks
contribute to the globally observed gender wage gap because women are much more likely to
experience career interruptions than men. For men, being drafted into military service repre-
sents a special form of career disruption that typically occurs between secondary and tertiary
education. An interruption at such an early point in one’s prospective labor-market career can
have far-reaching implications.2
3 Data construction and description
We use two datasets for our empirical analysis. The ﬁrst is provided by the state pension au-
thorities. This dataset (“Pension Data”) contains information on the service status of men and
their dates of birth. This allows us to compute the probability of serving in the armed forces
as a function of one’s date of birth, which is crucial to our identiﬁcation strategy. The second
data source (“IABS”) consists of administrative data provided by the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB).3 Except for some special groups, such as civil servants and the self-employed,
the dataset contains the total German population that was gainfully employed for at least one
day for the period 1975–1995. Observed characteristics of individuals include sex, date of birth,
nationality, and educational qualiﬁcation.
With respect to sample exclusions, the following observations were removed from both
datasets: females, East Germans (deﬁned as having at least one employment spell in East Ger-
many), persons who had an employment spell outside West Germany at any point (including
foreigners and ethnic German immigrants), persons born before January 1, 1934, and persons
born after December 31, 1940. Professional soldiers and those who underwent conscription
2See, for example, the introduction of Arulampalam, Gregg and Gregory [2001] on the “scarring” effects of
unemployment.
3See Bender, Haas and Klose [2000] for details. A new version of the IABS will be available for researchers via
theResearchDataCenteroftheGermanEmploymentAgencyintheInstituteforEmploymentResearch(RDC–IAB)
in 2011. See http://fdz.iab.de/en/FDZ_Projects/BASID.aspx/.
8and then subsequently became professional soldiers were also deleted from the datasets. We
excluded those people without a tertiary-system-entry certiﬁcate (Hochschulreife). Since these
people were virtually excluded from entering university, their decision to seek out tertiary ed-
ucation is most likely unaffected by the introduction of conscription. For the Pension Data,
this leaves us with 15,835 men born around the threshold date who, if they performed CMS,
served for not more than 12 months. For the IABS, we end up with 320,620 men. Notably, in
these years, only a negligible fraction of men were engaged in Zivildienst or other non-military
services (Wehrersatzdienst) as a substitute for CMS.
Persons are deﬁned as having a university degree if they earned a degree from a Hochschule,
which can take a number of forms such as the more technical Fachhochschule or the traditional
Universit¨ at. According to our data, 74 percent of men in the White Cohort, i.e., those born
before July 1937, have a university degree compared to a share of 79 percent among those in
the non-White Cohort. It would therefore seem that, among men who have the possibility
to enter university, those who faced a positive probability of being drafted are more likely
to obtain a tertiary degree.4 For a variety of reasons (e.g., selection bias), however, a simple
comparison of means will be able, at most, to give us an indication of the extent to which draft
eligibility is inﬂuencing the likelihood of graduating from university.
Figure 1 plots the share of conscripted men by month of birth. The White Cohort was
completely exempted from the conscription and therefore the region to the left of the threshold
date only contains points that lie at zero. To the right of the exemption threshold on the 1st of
July 1937, we observe that the share of men called into service started at about 18 percent,
which then continuously declined until about the middle of the 1938 birth cohort, after which
the probability of being drafted increased until the end of the sample period.
This evolution of the draft probability can be attributed to initial experienced in the ﬁrst
few years of the Bundeswehr. First, special exemptions were granted to some men.5 Second,
the Cold War was intensifying as these men were coming of age. Third, temporary deferments
of national service were granted to men who would experience serious personal or economic
hardship if drafted. Some of these temporary deferments became permanent as soon as men
4If we include those men who do not have a tertiary-system-entry certiﬁcate, the respective shares are 8 and
14 percent.
5For instance, the only son of a soldier killed in World War II was exempted. People who lost siblings may also
request for an exemption. Finally, those who will likely experience some form of economic hardship if drafted may
also be exempted.
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SOURCE. Authors’ own illustration based on Dataset 1.
turned 26 because the maximum age at which men could be drafted in Germany—except un-
der special circumstances—is 25.6
4 Estimation strategy and results
Our identiﬁcation strategy is anchored on the RD design of the military draft in Germany.7
The White Cohort—men born before July 1, 1937—was exempted from conscription. Let Ni be
equal to 1 if individual i does not belong to the White Cohort and 0 if he does. For those who
were born on or after the threshold date, men are subjected to a comprehensive medical exami-
nation upon coming of age to determine whether they are healthy enough to serve. Those who
fall short may defer national service and those who have severe health issues are immediately
and permanently exempted. Although one may be declared ﬁt for service, this does not neces-
sarily imply that one is immediately or actually drafted into service. The treatment status may
6Among others, exemptions are granted to volunteers to the police, the Federal Border Guard, and priests. The
special exemptions applied to about 10 percent of the men born between 1937 and 1944. About 3.5 percent of men
in a particular birth cohort were exempted because they crossed the age limit. [Wehrstruktur-Kommission 1971]
7For references on the RD design, see Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw [2001], van der Klaauw [2002], and Lee
and Lemieux [2010].
10thus be represented by Mi, which is equal to 1 if individual i was eventually called to serve in
the military and 0 otherwise. Men could therefore be in one of three different possible states:
(Mi = 0 and Ni = 0), (Mi = 0 and Ni = 1), and (Mi = 1 and Ni = 1).
The RD design is characterized by a treatment-assignment rule based on a known cutoff
point with respect to an observable and continuous variable, which is called, inter alia, the forc-
ing or running variable. As seen in Figure 1, the conditional probability of receiving treatment
(i.e., serving in the Bundeswehr) is known to be a discontinuous function of the date of birth,
Bi. Let B represent the threshold value at which point the conditional probability jumps—
that is, the date of birth that distinguishes members of the White Cohort from the rest. The




= 0. On the other hand,
for those born on or after B, the probability to be drafted is a function of a vector of individual





The situation represented by Figure 1 is called the partially fuzzy RD design, where the




Pr(Mi = 1|Bi = B) < lim
B↓B
Pr(Mi = 1|Bi = B),
where limB↑B Pr(Mi = 1|Bi = B)=0. The conditions for proper identiﬁcation of the treatment
effect in this case are similar to those required in the sharp RD design, which is the case when
the jump in the conditional probability is equal to one [Battistin and Rettore 2008].
To estimate the causal impact of conscription on the probability of having a univeristy
degree, we implement a two-sample two-stage least-squares (TS2SLS) approach developed by
Angrist and Krueger [1992]. The reason is that we can observe Bi in both datasets but only Mi
in the Pension Data and only Yi, the outcome variable, in the IABS.8 The sequential system of
equations is
Mi1 = α1 + f(Bi1)+δNi1 +  i1
Yi2 = α2 + g(Bi2)+τ  Mi2 + νi2,
8In a previous paper [Bauer et al. 2009], we were able to match individuals from both datasets. However, for
this paper, we obtained the whole sample of men from the IABS, not all of whom are available in our original
dataset. Therefore, we had to rely on TS2SLS to retrieve the required estimates.
11where the second subscript indicates which dataset is used. The variable  Mi2 denotes the cross-
sample ﬁtted values, which are computed by using the parameter estimates obtained from the
ﬁrst stage based on the Pension Data but using the observations in the IABS. The disturbance
terms are represented by  i1 and νi2. The terms f(Bi1) and g(Bi2) are some arbitrary continuous
functions of B. We apply the restriction f(Bi1)=g(Bi2) so that the system becomes essentially
a two-sample two-stage least-squares instrumental-variable estimator for the parameters in
the model.9
Military service is therefore instrumented by an individual’s date of birth, which is pre-
sumably independent of the decision to obtain a university degree. In our speciﬁcation, f(Bi1)
is modeled as a polynomial of the difference (measured in days) of a man’s date of birth and




. These individual differences are interacted with Ni1 to allow
for different slope parameters on either side of the threshold. The standard errors are subse-
quently corrected according to the method developed by Murphy and Topel [1985] regarding
generated regressors (our  Mi2), which was shown by Inoue and Solon [2010] as the correct
approach in the TS2SLS framework.
Two minor econometric issues arise in this context. First, we are estimating both equations
as linear probability models; thus, we are only linearly approximating the underlying condi-
tional expectation function. Second, one could restrict the sample for the ﬁrst-stage equation
to include only those men whose date of birth is later than June 30, 1937 since, by deﬁnition,
those born on or before that date will have Mi1 = 0. Accounting for the nonlinearity is an un-
necessary complication since, in an IV framework, one does not need consistent estimates of
the ﬁrst-stage coefﬁcients to retrieve consistent estimates of the coefﬁcients in a properly spec-
iﬁed second-stage model [Heckman 1978]. We therefore refrain from extensively interpreting
the coefﬁcient estimates in the ﬁrst stage. A linear second stage has the advantage of directly
providing the marginal effects. As for the partially fuzzy design, the predicted probabilities
of serving in the German armed forces for the White Cohort are extremely close to zero. For
instance, using the full sample, the maximum value of  Mi2 is less than 1× 10−12.
The coefﬁcient of interest is τ, which is interpreted as a local average treatment effect valid
for a small neighborhood around the point of discontinuity in the conditional probability of re-
ceiving treatment [Lee and Lemieux 2010]. That is, the estimand  τ is a consistent estimator of
9For details of the TS2SLS estimator, see Inoue and Solon [2010].
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
Yi(1) −Yi(0)|unit i is a complier and Bi = B

, where Yi(Mi) represents potential outcomes
and “complier” is used in the same sense as in Imbens and Angrist [1994]. Valid identiﬁcation
is possible as long as the conditional mean of the potential outcome Yi(0) is continuous at B
[Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw 2001]. The fundamental idea here is that, for as long as all
other factors that could affect one’s educational attainment affects it only in a continuous man-
ner, the jump in the probability of being drafted at the threshold point explains the difference
in educational attainment between the White Cohort and the non-White Cohort.
The control function f(Bi) is constructed using polynomials of the difference in days in
one’s birth date and the threshold date. Fully interacting the polynomials with the indicator
variable Ni permits different slope coefﬁcients on both sides of the cutoff point. Following
Angrist and Lavy [1999], the degree of the polynomial that we use in the regression decreases
as the discontinuity sample becomes tighter around the threshold point.
Table 1 presents the ﬁrst-stage results using the Pension Data; Table 2 shows the results of a
regression of a binary variable indicating completion of a university degree on the instrument
based on the IABS. All regressions include the control function f(Bi) with varying degrees
of the polynomial order. Table 1 shows that the probability of being drafted is positively re-
lated to one’s date of birth as captured by the indicator variable for being on either side of
the threshold. The coefﬁcient estimates for the binary instrumental variable range from 9.98
to 12.36 percentage points. In particular, for the cohort of men born in 1937, we recover an
estimate of 11.72 percentage points. Nevertheless, these estimated coefﬁcients should not be
given a causal interpretation for reasons already mentioned. What is rather more important
is that the t- and F-statistics indicate that there is a strong relationship between one’s date of
birth and the probability of conscription.
Table 2 presents the reduced-form estimates based on the IABS. Here, we highlight the fact
that, without instrumenting conscription, we obtain a statistically signiﬁcant relationship for
two subsamples (Cohorts 1935–1939 and 1937) between one’s date of birth, again as captured
by the binary instrumental variable for being part of the White Cohort or not, and the proba-
bility of having a university degree. This can be interpreted as the effect of the introduction of
conscription, i.e., as an intention-to-treat effect. Taking the estimate from the 1937 birth cohort,
the introduction of conscription raised the share of men with a university degree by about
13TABLE 1
FIRST-STAGE ESTIMATES (PENSION DATA)
Cohort
All 1935–1939 1936–1938 1937
Non-White Cohort 0.0998*** 0.1236*** 0.1193*** 0.1172***
[0.0204] [0.0148] [0.0120] [0.0165]
Polynomial degree J 32 11
F-statistic 317.81 84.49 57.13 41.71
Adjusted R2 0.1526 0.0500 0.0404 0.0533
Observations 15,835 11,099 6,668 2,171
NOTES. The dependent variable is having served in the armed forces. The
regressions include a constant term. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
SOURCE. Authors’ own calculation.
1.7 percentage points. As the reduced form only allows us to recover the intention-to-treat
effect, the estimate naturally understates the actual causal impact of conscription on draftees.
This is because of “noncompliance” in the group assigned to be treated. As shown in Fig-





All 1935–1939 1936–1938 1937
Non-White Cohort 0.0121 0.0129* 0.0106 0.0170**
[0.0075] [0.0071] [0.0069] [0.0080]
Polynomial degree J 32 1 1
F-statistic 100.83 45.74 13.27 2.46
Adjusted R2 0.0028 0.0014 0.005 0.0001
Observations 320,620 225,233 132,121 43,197
NOTES. The dependent variable is having a university degree. The regressions
include a constant term. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
SOURCE. Authors’ own calculation.
Our estimates are very close to the result obtained by Card and Lemieux [2001], who esti-
mate a 2-percentage-point increase in the share of men with a university degree in the US. In
line with their results, we attribute this ﬁnding to the existence of “draft dodgers” in the popu-
lation. Since going to university affords male students the opportunity to avoid being drafted,
higher education can be used to decrease the likelihood of serving in the armed forces. In
Germany, one could still legally be drafted after reaching the maximum age for conscription
(25 years old) if the reason for deferment was to complete a university degree. However, in
our dataset, only 290 men were drafted after the age of 25. This means that crossing the age
threshold—even if the deferment is due to university participation—resulted in a de facto per-
14manent exemption. For draft dodgers, university participation provided a safe haven. Conse-
quently, for the cohorts under scrutiny, draft avoidance apparently overwhelmed the possible
negative effect of conscription (due to the adverse effect on the returns to human capital) on
the probability of pursuing a university degree.
As in the standard “grouping estimator” of Wald [1940], to obtain an estimate of the causal
effect of military service, the estimates in Table 2 are normalized by dividing them with the
corresponding estimates in the ﬁrst-stage regressions in Table 1. More precisely, this proce-
dure allows recovering the local average treatment effect for observations around the thresh-
old point [Imbens and Angrist 1994; Lee and Lemieux 2010]. The only difference that must be
taken into account here is that the estimates in Tables 1 and 2 derive from different samples,
which means that the standard errors must be corrected [Inoue and Solon 2010]. The consis-
tency of the estimator, however, is unaffected by the fact that we use moment conditions from
one sample and apply it to another [Angrist and Krueger 1992].
Table 3 shows results using the TS2SLS approach that exploits the RD design of the mili-
tary draft. Our estimates indicate that conscription had a positive impact on the probability of
obtaining a university degree. Although the statistical signiﬁcance of our estimates depend on
which cohorts we use, the estimate is signiﬁcant for precisely that subsample for which the va-
lidity of the RD estimate is most credible. That is, since the RD estimate is valid only for those
observations within a small neighborhood around the threshold, we take the estimates using
only those men born in 1937 as the one with the highest internal validity. By this measure,
we calculate that conscription raised the probability of having a university degree by about
15 percentage points.
TABLE 3
IMPACT OF CMS ON UNIVERSITY GRADUATION
Cohort
All 1935–1939 1936–1938 1937
Military service 0.1212 0.1042* 0.0891 0.1455**
[0.0748] [0.0573] [0.0577] [0.0679]
Polynomial degree J 32 11
NOTES. Bracketed numbers are Murphy–Topel [1985] standard errors. The
regressions include a constant term. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
SOURCE. Authors’ own calculation.
A concern is whether the compulsory schooling laws in Germany—in particular, the reg-
ulation on the age of school entry—could generate a similar effect on our outcome variable
15of interest, thereby rendering the estimates suspect. Men born later in the year enter school
older than men born earlier in the year. If there is an age-of-entry effect, whereby older pupils
perform better in school, this may bias our estimates.10 Simply put, men born after July 1 in
the year 1937, because they are older than the rest of their school cohort, may have a higher
probability of entering the Gymnasium, which is the type of secondary school which can supply
graduates to the university system.11 If this is true, then we should expect a higher probability
of obtaining a university degree for men born in the second half of the year—for every year.
This provides us with an opportunity to test whether the age-of-entry effect is confounding
our results. If we ﬁnd a similar positive effect in other years, then it is likely that the previ-
ous estimates do not accurately reﬂect the direct impact of conscription on the probability of
obtaining a university degree. We can create a dataset where the discontinuity is relocated
somewhere else and then similarly re-estimate our model; we do this for the year 1938. The
results are presented in Table 4. These “placebo regressions” indicate that there is no evidence
of a positive effect on the probability of having a university degree for men born in later parts
of the year.
TABLE 4
PLACEBO REGRESSIONS WITH SIMULATED DISCONTINUITY IN 1938
Cohort
All 1935–1939 1936–1939 1937–1938
Placebo −0.0553 −0.0269 −0.0436 −0.0483
[0.0635] [0.0635] [0.0682] [0.0617]
Polynomial degree J 4 221
NOTES. Bracketed numbers are Murphy–Topel [1985] standard errors. The
regressions include a constant term. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
SOURCE. Authors’ own calculation.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In Western Europe, Germany became the latest country to effectively abolish compulsory mili-
tary service. However, many countries still rely on conscription to staff their respective armed
forces. The effects on the lives of young men of a policy relying on what is essentially in-
10For the literature on this, see, e.g., Angrist and Krueger [1992], Fertig and Kluve [2005], Puhani and Weber
[2005], and Lincove and Painter [2006].
11The Gymnasium has a higher admission requirement in terms of the potential student’s previous academic per-
formance. Graduates of the two other types of schools, the Realschule and the Hauptschule, do not have a similarly
easy way to access to tertiary education.
16voluntary labor is a subject of extreme economic and political—if not moral—importance. To
contribute to the debate, we examine the relationship between conscription and the demand
for higher education in Germany.
We exploit the regression-discontinuity design of the military draft in Germany in the 1950s
using a sample of men born between 1934 and 1940 to examine the impact of conscription on
tertiary educational attainment. The law governing conscription allows us to distinguish two
groups of men: those born before July 1, 1937, who belong to the so-called White Cohort,
and those born afterwards. What is peculiar about the White Cohort is that its members were
completely exempted from performing military service. The rest, on the other hand, faced a
positive probability of being drafted. This discontinuity in the treatment assignment based on
a man’s date of birth is used to obtain consistent estimates of the effect of conscription on the
probability of having a university degree.
Like previous country-speciﬁc studies [Card and Lemieux 2001; Maurin and Xenogiani
2007], we ﬁnd that the presence of conscription increased the demand for post-secondary in-
vestments in human capital.12 We estimate this intention-to-treat effect of conscription to be
1.7 percentage points. We attribute this to the fact that enrollment in an educational institution
is an effective method to avoid the draft.
There are several reasons why men would prefer not to serve in the armed forces. In the
period under study, men were growing up fresh out of World War II. Presumably, the ravages
of war were vividly imprinted in their (and in their parents’) minds, leading to an understand-
able desire not to be involved with the armed forces. Moreover, the Cold War was intensifying
andthe distinctpossibility ofanotherarmed conﬂicterupting withintheir lifetime—or, indeed,
while they were on active duty—was not at all remote, if not increasingly likely. It seemed that
retreating to university and away from the military had been the optimal choice for some men.
Our estimate of the effect of conscription itself (and not simply its introduction) on the
probability of obtaining a university degree is rather striking. The estimates range from about
9 to 15 percentage points, with the higher bound exhibiting the highest level of statistical sig-
niﬁcance within our range of estimates. By virtue of the fact that our estimate is much higher
than the reported effects in other studies, it should be subjected to a stricter level of scrutiny.
Thus, we emphasize caution in generalizing this estimated effect to the rest of the population.
12Incontrast, Keller, PoutvaaraandWagener[2009], usingcross-countryregressions, ﬁndasmallnegativeeffect.
17We posit three reasons to explain our ﬁndings. The ﬁrst reason can be indirectly attributed
to skill atrophy. Human capital—in particular, that part of one’s stock that is not used in
the armed forces but is rewarded in the civilian sector—tends to depreciate while on active
duty. Replacing lost human capital requires additional education on the part of the former
conscript. Havingalreadyﬁnishedsecondaryeducation, thenextlogicalstepwouldbetoenter
a higher educational institution, where human capital can be re-acquired [Keller, Poutvaara
and Wagener 2009].
Second, human-capital acquisition post-conscription allows men to catch up with the rest
of their cohort in terms of earnings. It is well known that the experience–earnings proﬁles
are dissimilar by educational attainment. While, on average, earnings increase as a function
of labor-market experience, the slope of this function is much higher for university graduates
than for non-graduates. Furthermore, the age–earnings proﬁle of a university graduate would
exhibit a longer ﬂat region before reﬂecting a positive slope, indicating the fact that the person
has spent more years in the school system before entering the labor market. This ﬂat region
would be even longer for conscripts, which could induce them to resort to university training
after their service in the hopes of quickly matching the earnings of their non-conscripted peers.
Finally, conscription has been shown to have heterogeneous effects based on one’s socioe-
conomic standing. Using the father’s occupation as a proxy for a person’s socioeconomic sta-
tus, Di Pietro [2009] showed that the abolition of the draft in Italy had a detrimental (that is,
negative) effect on the university enrollment of men from disadvantaged backgrounds. We are
unable to make the same distinction here. However, we can speculate that the positive effect
we estimated may be driven by the share of men coming from disadvantaged families. In other
words, conscription drove men with higher discount rates—generally a characteristic associ-
ated with men who are less educated and are disadvantaged—to invest in a university degree.
Furthermore, until the recent abolition of compulsory military service, men from households
with a higher average income were less likely to serve in the armed forces [Bauer and Schmidt
2010].
Taking the estimated effect at face value would lead to the conclusion that the recent abo-
lition of conscription in Germany will reduce men’s probability of investing in university-
generated human capital. We are, however, tentative in elaborating on policy recommenda-
18tions because of two principal reasons. First, treatment effects obtained by exploiting an RD
design are extremely localized because the source of identifying variation is itself highly spe-
ciﬁc. The discontinuity in the conditional probability of being drafted into the armed forces is
what allows us to credibly recover the treatment effect. But this effect is most valid only for
the subpopulation of men in a shrinking neighborhood around that discontinuity point. Esti-
mating the effect of conscription for men away from the threshold involves a certain amount
of extrapolation which we hesitate to do, since the identifying assumption that makes the es-
timates from the RD design valid is less likely to hold the farther away one moves from the
point of discontinuity.
Second, the institutions governing conscription in Germany at that time were quite differ-
ent from what they are today. For instance, opting for civilian service was a viable alternative
in recent years. In general, which skills are acquired and lost turns on whether one is either
in the military or in the civilian sector. In the period analyzed in the present study, men who
were called to perform national service would have faced severe difﬁculties substituting civil-
ian service for military service.
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